


Research Paper

Adjoa Anyimadu

Africa Programme | March 2016

Politics and Development in Tanzania

Shifting the Status Quo



**CHATHAM
HOUSE**

The Royal Institute of
International Affairs

Contents

	Summary	2
1	Introduction	3
2	The Political Landscape	5
3	Zanzibar's Political Outlook	11
4	Security Through Service Delivery	16
5	Economic Governance	21
6	Regional Role and International Relations	27
7	Conclusion	33
	About the Author	35
	Acknowledgments	35

Summary

- Despite its long-standing reputation for stability, Tanzania's journey to a prosperous socio-economic future has entered a period of flux. Key issues facing the country's new government include: shifting trends in the needs of Tanzania's young and growing population; strengthening political opposition and destabilization of the union with Zanzibar; transparency in the country's mineral and agricultural wealth and resources; and its unique geopolitical position between East and southern Africa.
- Tanzania's president, Dr John Pombe Magufuli, was elected in October 2015 and has already made his mark as a frugal leader committed to battling waste in the public sector and punishing poor performance in delivering public services. Although an early spate of sackings and cut-backs won popular support, he faces a more difficult challenge in dealing with strong and sometimes divergent dynamics within his ruling party, particularly if the priorities of the political elite contradict his efforts to combat corruption.
- The annulment of Zanzibar's elections, and the announcement that they would be re-run despite the objection of opposition parties and the expressed concerns of international election observation missions, demonstrates the high stakes of maintaining the political status quo on the semi-autonomous islands. Without central leadership, the ongoing political impasse could undercut Tanzania's reputation for stability.
- Basic development – especially in education, health, electrification, water access and sanitation – remains key to economic improvement. However, without fast implementation, the ruling party could be punished at the next polls by voters tired of unfulfilled promises. In addition, dissatisfaction of a young, under-employed population is a slow-burning but important potential challenge to continued stability.
- The global downturn in oil and gas prices has compounded delays in Tanzania's emergence as a gas exporter. Significant, but dwindling, opportunity remains for the development of a gas industry that could move Tanzania closer to the middle-income country status central to its development vision. This advance is dependent on clear and decisive policy-making that balances the concerns of a population, with high expectations, and the priorities of the extractive companies whose investment on the southern Tanzanian coast could be transformative.
- Tanzania has played a vital role as a quiet but effective mediator in East and Central Africa. While the country continues to carefully balance its membership of both the East African Community and the Southern African Development Community, its leaders will increasingly rely on political dexterity to maintain Tanzania's unique position in a region with numerous powerful national leaders.

1. Introduction

Tanzania has built a reputation for long-standing peace and stability, in marked contrast to its Central and East African neighbours. However, this reputation was tested by a series of political hurdles in the lead-up to the country's October 2015 presidential and parliamentary elections. A referendum on a new constitution scheduled for 30 April 2015 was delayed indefinitely, risking strain to the 51-year-old union between the mainland and the semi-autonomous islands of Zanzibar, as calls for the latter's increased autonomy – sparked by a drawn-out constitutional review process – were left unanswered. Furthermore, the selection of a presidential candidate for the ruling *Chama Cha Mapinduzi* (CCM) in July 2015 exposed fractures in the party that has dominated Tanzanian politics since independence in 1961. The results of the elections were less predictable than those of previous polls, as high-profile defections from CCM to the newly united opposition unbalanced established political hierarchies.

CCM continued its domination of politics with an overwhelming win in the parliamentary elections and with the election of the party's candidate, Dr John Pombe Magufuli, to the presidency. Magufuli's win was decisive, but his 59 per cent of the vote was the smallest majority in Tanzania's recent political history. President Magufuli's popularity has since been bolstered by early action focused on cost-cutting and punishment for poor delivery of public services, but he is yet to negotiate a peaceful solution to the fallout from the annulment in 2015 of the elections in Zanzibar. The ongoing impasse has the potential to undercut Tanzania's reputation for stability.

Long rule by a single, dominant party has done much to secure stability, but popular demand for change was clear in the run-up to the 2015 elections. The polls indicated a desire among voters for a shift in the political status quo.

Long rule by a single, dominant party has done much to secure stability, but popular demand for change was clear in the run-up to the 2015 elections. The polls indicated a desire among voters for a shift in the political status quo. To address this, the government under President Magufuli will need to deliver on promised changes and accomplish its development ambition of Tanzania achieving middle-income country status by 2025.

The new CCM government must also manage societal change (and provide corresponding reforms to public service delivery), improve economic governance to harness the country's huge potential and respond to shifting regional and international relationships. The challenges it will face include rapid population growth and contestation of the degree of Zanzibar's autonomy within the union. The new administration must also foster a viable policy framework for the development of gas resources and infrastructure, in order to promote equitable economic growth.

These political upheavals come at a time when planning for the socio-economic future of the country is at a crucial stage, as Tanzania's population of 53 million is set to double in the next 15 years. This paper assesses where Tanzania stands today, and outlines the shifting economic, social and governance factors that the country's new administration will face.

Map 1: United Republic of Tanzania



2. The Political Landscape

Tanzania's constitution codifies the country's status as a 'democratic, secular and socialist state'.¹ The country's first president, Julius Nyerere, regarded as the father of the nation, led Tanzania for its first 24 years following independence, and the legacy of *ujamaa*, his brand of 'African socialism', continues to colour the outlook of the state. Nyerere's promotion of a singular Tanzanian identity over tribal or religious affiliations, and his prioritization of Kiswahili over English as the official language of government, education and culture, has had a lasting impact. Since independence, Tanzania has undergone a process of nation-building that has embedded a far more defined sense of national identity than is found among its East African neighbours. This factor underlies Tanzania's long-standing stability, and has lasted politically and culturally despite the country's move towards economic liberalization at the end of Nyerere's presidency.

Political decision-making is highly centralized but complicated by vested interests among cliques within the ruling party. Pacts between CCM factions have influenced the development of a governance culture that, although based on democratically held elections, carves up political space between select elite groups. This allows little room for the inclusion of views from outside high-ranking political circles. Combined with the prominence of nationalism, this lends governance a parochial dimension and arguably contributes to hesitancy towards regional integration and freedoms for the private sector.

Government expenditure remains dependent on international aid, particularly for development initiatives and public service delivery. The country is one of the largest recipients of international aid in sub-Saharan Africa, receiving its highest flows from the United States, the World Bank and the EU.² From 2007 to 2011, approximately one-third of government spending was financed by donor funds, although this share fell to about 20 per cent from 2012 to 2014.³ There is a tension between Tanzania's donor reliance and its official calls for self-sufficiency, which were inspired by the Arusha Declaration of 1967 that set out Nyerere's vision of self-reliant African socialism. This posture was most recently evident in the national budget for 2015–16, which explicitly aimed to reduce dependence on international aid. Donors are moving towards providing targeted sectoral support, particularly for health and education, rather than non-earmarked general budget support. This has influenced the design and execution of policy relating to development, even as some government departments have chafed against condition-bound foreign financial aid interpreted as limiting the country's self-sufficiency. As well as providing Tanzania with needed funding, the sustained size of these financial flows, despite occasional suspension during repeated corruption scandals, indicates the importance of Tanzania to donors' own policy objectives.

¹ Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, paragraph 3, section 1, <http://www.judiciary.go.tz/downloads/constitution.pdf>. In a draft constitution crafted in 2013–14, references to socialism have been removed.

² See OECD–DAC, Development finance statistics, <http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats> (accessed 16 Jan. 2016).

³ *Country Assistance Strategies Overview*, Development Partners Group Tanzania: <http://www.tzdp.org.or.tz/dpg-website/dpg-tanzania/country-assistance-strategies-overview.html> (accessed 19 Feb. 2016).

Box 1: Tanzania's constitutional structure

The United Republic of Tanzania is a single state under a presidential parliamentary democratic system, consisting of a union between mainland Tanzania (known until 1964 as Tanganyika) and the islands of Zanzibar, the largest of which are Unguja and Pemba. Tanganyika and Zanzibar entered into the union in 1964, and under the union's terms Zanzibar has semi-autonomous status. Mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar each maintain executive, judiciary and legislative organs. In Zanzibar, these have authority over a set of issues described in Tanzania's constitution as 'non-union matters', which include health, education and the environment.⁴ On the mainland, these organs have responsibility for state functions over the whole of Tanzania's territory – including the mainland and union matters in Zanzibar.

The parliament of Tanzania is based in the capital city, Dodoma, while the government sits in Dar es Salaam. The new parliament is larger than it was previously, with 369 members. The majority of members are directly elected through a first-past-the-post system in 264 constituencies, of which 214 are on mainland Tanzania and 50 in Zanzibar. The attorney general, who is selected by the president of Tanzania, and up to 10 presidentially appointed members also sit in parliament, in addition to five members elected from a vote within the Zanzibar House of Representatives. According to Tanzania's constitution, at least 30 per cent of seats in the national parliament should be reserved for women. After the 2015 elections, 110 special seats were allocated for women, divided between the two leading parties in accordance with their national vote-share. The speaker of the parliament is elected by members, and takes on presidential duties if the president and vice-president are outside the country.

Since 1985, the presidential office has been limited to two five-year terms, and this has always been respected. Its power is extensive, with key members of the executive and judiciary directly appointed by the president. In addition to the selection of the prime minister and other ministers, the president appoints the director of public prosecutions, the chair and commissioners of the National Electoral Commission, as well as the chief justice and all High Court judges. Tanzania's constitution stipulates that if a president is elected from mainland Tanzania, the vice-president must be from Zanzibar, and vice versa. In 2015, the Zanzibari CCM politician Samia Suluhu Hassan became Tanzania's first female vice-president.

Executive power over non-union matters in Zanzibar is exercised by the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar, headed by the president of Zanzibar and two vice-presidents. Zanzibar has a Legislative Council, consisting of the president of Zanzibar and a House of Representatives, of which 54 members are directly elected. In addition, the president of Zanzibar nominates 10 members of the House of Representatives, two of which must be agreed with the leader of the opposition. At least 40 per cent of seats must be reserved for women, and these are distributed proportionally between the political parties that receive the most votes in elections. During elections, in addition to voting for the president of Tanzania and for members of the Tanzanian parliament, Zanzibaris cast votes for members of the House of Representatives and the president of Zanzibar. The rights of Zanzibaris, the institutions of its government, and the process of elections for Zanzibar's president and its House of Representatives are key issues set out in Zanzibar's constitution.

In 2010, a referendum in Zanzibar endorsed the formation of a government of national unity (GNU) for the islands, establishing a new system by which the presidential candidate who comes second in elections joins the government as the first vice-president. The GNU framework was enshrined in Zanzibar's constitution.

The enduring power of CCM

Political power since independence has remained highly centralized around the presidency and influential but divided CCM party elite groups. President Nyerere merged his Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) with the Zanzibari Afro-Shirazi Party in 1977 to create CCM, which has held

⁴ The Articles of Union established in 1964 covered 11 areas, but domestic and regional changes resulted in additions to the number of issues considered to be union matters. In the constitution of 1977, 22 areas were listed as union matters.

on to power despite the move to multiparty democracy in 1992. During the Nyerere era, CCM party cadres and members of the TANU youth league were encouraged to join the Tanzanian People's Defence Force and the civil service. The historical weight of TANU and subsequent political strength of CCM enabled the establishment of a strong network of influence that remains embedded down to the grassroots level across the country. CCM's reach raises questions about the extent of lingering party influence over state institutions, despite the decoupling of the party apparatus from the state when the country embarked on multipartyism.⁵

Its strong rural support lends CCM a reliable voting bloc as, despite rapid urbanization, over 70 per cent of Tanzanians live in rural areas.⁶ Until recent years, the centrality of CCM within the political sphere meant that the most politically ambitious individuals tended to stay within the party. However, the defection of ex-prime minister and former CCM stalwart Edward Lowassa in July 2015, and his subsequent selection as the opposition's presidential candidate, led to a cavalcade of other high-profile defections, exemplifying the depth of the party's internal divisions. There could still be a positive outcome for CCM, however. If a more unified outlook results from the departure of Lowassa's influential camp, this could reduce internal dissent over policy decisions.

John Magufuli: a president for change?

In the early days of his presidency, President Magufuli made a high-impact demonstration of his no-nonsense style of leadership and his commitment to eliminating waste, poor service delivery and corruption from the public sector. Spot-checks carried out by the president and Prime Minister Kassim Majaliwa in late 2015 and early 2016 resulted in the suspension and sacking of senior officials at the Tanzania Revenue Authority, the Tanzania Ports Authority, the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau, the Weights and Measures Agency and the National Identification Authority, sending a public warning to other civil servants that they would be expected to embody Magufuli's campaign pledge of *Hapi Kaza Tu* [work and nothing else]. The public's perception of governmental commitment to fighting corruption deteriorated during Jakaya Kikwete's presidency over the past decade,⁷ underlining the importance of President Magufuli's early demonstration of his intention to combat graft.

Magufuli's early cost-cutting measures included replacing Tanzania's independence day celebrations with a national clean-up campaign, banning unnecessary foreign travel for government officials, prohibiting the use of expensive hotels for government meetings and streamlining the cabinet. He appointed 22 ministers and 20 deputy ministers – 11 fewer government members than were in Kikwete's cabinet. These early efforts won Magufuli praise within Tanzania, and drew favourable comparison with other East African leaders. However, his ability to sustain this early decisiveness and tendency to austerity will depend heavily on factors that, at least partly, lie outside the president's control.

The first is the strength of CCM's internal hierarchy. The party elite could limit the extent to which the new government can sweep away well-connected figures associated with past corruption. Although Magufuli is a party stalwart with over 20 years of experience in the ministries of works, lands and livestock, he is not considered part of the upper echelons of the CCM elite. His selection as the ruling party's presidential

⁵ The Nyalali Commission, established by presidential decree in 1991, set out plans for Tanzania to move towards a multiparty political system and also called for an easing of the symbiotic relationship between the upper echelons of the ruling party and the Tanzanian People's Defence Force.

⁶ National Bureau of Statistics, Tanzania (2015), *Tanzania in Figure 2014*, http://www.nbs.go.tz/nbs/takwimu/references/Tanzania_in_Figures_2015.pdf (accessed 27 Jan. 2016).

⁷ In a 2005 survey, 27 per cent of respondents said that the government was bad or very bad at combating corruption. By 2014 this figure had risen to 58 per cent. AfroBarometer (2015), *Tanzanians perceive ineffective fight against corruption, say citizens have a role to play*, 24 September 2015, http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Dispatches/ab_r6_dispatchno48_corruption_in_tanzania.pdf (accessed 20 Oct. 2015).

candidate in July 2015 had not been widely predicted, as stiff competition was mounted by high-profile candidates including Edward Lowassa, then still a member of CCM, who was buoyed by his influential clique; and the then foreign minister Bernard Membe, seen as outgoing President Kikwete's first choice. Magufuli emerged as CCM's uncontroversial consensus candidate, meaning that to pass contentious measures his government will rely on the goodwill of CCM grandees such as Kikwete, who remains the party's chairman; and the party's secretary-general, Abdulrahman Kinana, appointed by Kikwete in 2012, who ensures that the government does not deviate from party ideals.

Despite long-running reforms throughout the 1990s, the public sector remains ineffective at implementing development policies and at providing adequate services, including in health and education.

A second potential limit consists of capacity constraints in the civil service. Despite long-running reforms throughout the 1990s, the public sector remains ineffective at implementing development policies and at providing adequate services, including in health and education. President Magufuli's removal of senior officials from prominent civil service positions sends a strong message that poor delivery will be punished, but sustaining improvements will require combating long-standing inefficiencies to ensure that well-designed policy focused on improving basic development outcomes can be implemented. This also comes at a time when government spending needs to be curtailed.

Magufuli's early popularity could be dented by moves seen as consolidating presidential control. Although he presides over a streamlined cabinet, his selection of more permanent secretaries than in previous governments suggests a desire to hold direct authority over the technocratic aspects of policy implementation. The president has also been criticized for his silence over the political impasse in Zanzibar. By appointing only three Zanzibaris to his cabinet, and selecting fewer female ministers than in the previous government, President Magufuli risks allowing a focus on technocratic ability to overshadow the need for political savvy in balancing the demands of influential groups in the country.

UKAWA: A newly united opposition

Umoja wa Katiba ya Wananchi [Coalition for the People's Constitution] (UKAWA) was formed in 2014, as four opposition parties coalesced around their grievances over perceived CCM control of the process of reviewing Tanzania's constitution. Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo [Party for Democracy and Progress] (CHADEMA), the Civic United Front (CUF), and two smaller opposition parties, the National Convention for Construction and Reform (NCCR-Mageuzi), and the National League for Democracy (NLD) staged a walk-out from the Constituent Assembly convened to review a new draft constitution in April 2014. Their aim was to bring pressure to halt discussions through protests against the Constituent Assembly.

The initial unity of the opposition was based on a shared perception of bias and discrimination within the Constituent Assembly,⁸ and was cemented by CCM's removal of the more radical aspects of the 'people's constitution' that had emerged from initial consultation. The most prominent disagreement concerned the decision to remove the draft's proposals to change the constitutional

⁸ CUF's former national chair, Ibrahim Lipumba, led the walkout, citing discrimination against the members of the Constituent Assembly who disagreed with the government view. Mtulya, A. and Magubira, P. (2014), 'Walkout puts CA in limbo', *Citizen*, 17 April 2014, <http://www.thecitizen.co.tz/News/Walkout-puts-CA-in-limbo/-/1840392/2282600/-/ksrn7pz/-/index.html> (accessed 19 Apr. 2015).

order by establishing a new government for Tanzania's mainland, maintaining Zanzibar's government and introducing one overarching federal government. This proposal was commonly referred to as the three-tier union system. The UKAWA coalition has held despite the indefinite postponement of a referendum on the new constitution. Its decision to put forward a single candidate in the 2015 presidential elections signalled its intention to maintain this unity within the new parliament. This unity was also solidified by the wins of UKAWA parties in the most highly politicized constituencies for municipal elections, where the polls scheduled to take place in December 2014 were repeatedly delayed. On 17 January 2016, CHADEMA gained the mayoral seats of the Ilala and Kinondoni municipalities of Dar es Salaam, while CUF candidates became deputy-mayors. The election of the mayor of Dar es Salaam was indefinitely postponed in January 2016; there are indications that this was because CCM feared a further UKAWA win in a major urban centre.

Box 2: Tanzania's main opposition parties

Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (CHADEMA)

CHADEMA is the biggest member of the UKAWA coalition. It is nominally a centre-right party, and is affiliated internationally with the conservative International Democrat Union.⁹ Ideologically it is not strongly differentiated from other political parties in Tanzania. CHADEMA is associated with young urban voters, particularly in northern Tanzania. It overtook CUF to become the main parliamentary opposition party in 2010, after elections in which CCM's popular support started to weaken as CHADEMA won voters over with a vociferously anti-corruption platform. CHADEMA's chair, Freeman Mbowe, is the leader of the opposition in parliament. Edward Lowassa joined the party from CCM to become the UKAWA coalition's presidential candidate in 2015.

Civic United Front (CUF)

The Civic United Front (CUF) is a liberal party seen as representing the interests of Muslim Tanzanians in the southern mainland and in Zanzibar, and forms part of the UKAWA coalition. It has been the third-largest party in Tanzania's National Assembly since 2010, but it is a more prominent political force in Zanzibar, fighting for the presidency of the islands in closely-run elections against CCM since multiparty polls were first held in 1995. CUF formed part of Zanzibar's government of national unity with CCM from 2010 until late 2015, when CUF ministers left in protest against the annulment of elections on the islands.

The National Convention for Construction and Reform (NCCR-Mageuzi)

NCCR-Mageuzi became Tanzania's leading opposition party after the 1995 elections, the first polls that followed the return to multiparty democracy, but its support base has dwindled significantly since. Its current chair, James Mbatia, is also its sole member of the National Assembly. The party is a member of UKAWA.

National League for Democracy (NLD)

The National League for Democracy is the smallest member of UKAWA. In 2005, during the last presidential elections it participated in, the party garnered 0.19 per cent of the electorate's support. The party's chair, Emmanuel Makaidi, died just ahead of the 2015 elections, reducing the NLD's prominence on the front line of UKAWA campaigning in the last days before the polls.

The Alliance for Change and Transparency (ACT-Wazalendo)

ACT-Wazalendo is the most prominent opposition party outside the UKAWA coalition. Launched in March 2015, it is a socialist party that aspires to Nyerere's legacy and aims for a reintroduction of elements of his *ujamaa* ideology. The party's presidential candidate in 2015, Anna Mghwira, was the sole woman in the running and came third with 0.65 per cent of the vote. ACT gained in national prominence when Zitto Kabwe, the influential former chair of the parliamentary Public Accounts Committee, joined as the party's leader in 2015 following his expulsion from CHADEMA.

⁹ Other members include the United Kingdom's Conservative Party, Australia's Liberal Party and Germany's Christian Democratic Union.

A new role for parliament?

The experience of cross-party cooperation in the run-up to the 2015 elections could enrich the coherence and maturity of the opposition's role within Tanzania's new parliament, potentially enhancing the capability of the legislature in providing checks and balances to the government. However, this depends on the parties within the UKAWA coalition identifying a unified policy stance. Issues of anti-corruption and increased transparency, particularly over the management of Tanzania's gas, have led to opposition unity in the past. But the selection of former high-ranking CCM stalwart and former prime minister, Edward Lowassa, as UKAWA's presidential candidate disrupted the coalition's policy coherence and unbalanced established hierarchies within CHADEMA and CUF.¹⁰ Despite early gains for UKAWA partners in the municipal elections, there have also been recent signs of intra-coalition competition. The parties reneged on an agreement to support joint candidates in each constituency in the 2015 elections. The legacy of this competition between NCCR-Mageuzi, NLD, CHADEMA and CUF parliamentary candidates could still be a dilution of future opposition unity in parliament.¹¹

The ability of parliament to hold the executive to account has been growing in recent years. The 2010–15 parliament saw the opposition and parliamentary committees tackling high-profile national scandals. These included the investigation, launched in March 2014, by the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) into suspicious withdrawals of an estimated \$122 million from a Bank of Tanzania escrow account co-owned by Tanzania Electric Supply Company (TANESCO), the national electricity supplier, and Independent Power Tanzania Limited (IPTL), a company contracted to provide emergency electricity during power shortages. The PAC's dogged interest in the escrow scandal resulted in the resignation of the attorney-general and the energy minister, and the sacking of the lands minister and several senior officials. In December 2013, the Select Committee for Lands, Natural Resources and Environment's exposed gross human rights abuses carried out by state security forces during Operation Tokomeza, a heavy-handed anti-poaching initiative; this resulted in the sacking of four ministers.¹²

However, CCM has proved able to overcome parliamentary resistance, particularly on issues considered to be of greatest political importance to the government. In July 2015, three bills relating to the nascent gas export sector – the Petroleum Bill, the Oil and Gas Revenues Management Bill, and the Tanzania Extractive Industries (Transparency and Accountability) Bill – were passed by parliament in controversial circumstances. Despite calls from Tanzanian civil society, donors and international oil and gas firms for more time to review the bills, and an opposition boycott of parliament that centred on arguments that the bills' presentation breached parliamentary protocol, they were rushed through by CCM members in a parliamentary session when most of the opposition was absent (as the speaker's suspension of 43 opposition members had prompted their party colleagues to walk out in protest).

¹⁰ Wilibrod Slaa, CHADEMA's popular presidential candidate in 2010, resigned from the party in August 2015 and later left the country, citing dissatisfaction with the process through which Lowassa was accepted as CHADEMA's candidate and pointing to the allegations of corruption that led to Lowassa's resignation as prime minister in 2008. Slaa later professed his support for CCM's John Magufuli. Ibrahim Lipumba, CUF's longest-serving chairperson, stepped down in August 2015, citing the selection of Lowassa as demonstrating UKAWA's move away from the principles on which the coalition was founded.

¹¹ Parties within UKAWA put up candidates against each other in 77 of Tanzania's 265 constituencies. In 10 of these, three of the four UKAWA parties competed against each other. These constituencies were in Kigoma, Manyara, Mara, Mbeya, Morogoro, Mtwara, Tabora and Tanga, demonstrating that intra-coalition competition was not regionally bound.

¹² For details of these abuses, see Tanzania Legal and Human Rights Centre (2015), *Operesheni Tokomeza Ujangili Report 2014*, <http://www.humanrights.or.tz/downloads/tokomeza%20repor.pdf> (accessed 14 Mar. 2015).

3. Zanzibar's Political Outlook

Election stalemate

The state of limbo that followed the annulment of the 2015 elections for Zanzibar's presidency and House of Representatives illustrates the divisiveness of the islands' politics, and the high stakes involved in maintaining Zanzibar's political status quo. On 28 October, three days after the elections and following the announcement of results for 31 of Zanzibar's 54 constituencies, the chair of Zanzibar's Electoral Commission (ZEC), Jecha Salim Jecha, cancelled the vote without consultation with other electoral commissioners, alleging that gross violations had occurred during the electoral process, including intimidation of voters and the alteration of results. This action was challenged by Tanzanian civil society organizations and international election observer missions.¹³ CUF added its voice to the denunciation as the party's presidential candidate, Seif Sharif Hamad, who was then Zanzibar's first vice-president, had already announced that CUF's parallel tallying showed he had won the election with a 52.8 per cent share of votes cast. The declaration in January 2016 that a re-run would take place on 20 March 2016 came after more than four months of uncertainty, as talks between CUF and CCM representatives stalled.¹⁴ President Magufuli's absence from the discussions was notable, and perhaps indicated a desire to distance his popularity, built on a reputation for decisive action, from a messy outcome seemingly driven by CCM's ambition to maintain power in Zanzibar no matter the cost.

The five multiparty elections that have taken place in Zanzibar since 1995 have been closely contested between CCM and CUF. Political division there is exacerbated by geography as CCM support is largely found on Zanzibar's largest island, Unguja, while CUF draws its greatest support from Pemba.¹⁵ The ZEC chair's allegation that double-voting and voter intimidation had occurred in Pemba implied that CUF was responsible for the electoral misconduct, a challenge vehemently denied by the party.

The political settlement in place in Zanzibar ahead of the 2015 elections was hard-won. CUF accusations of CCM interference in past polls led CUF to reject the official results of the islands' elections in 1995, 2000 and 2005. Violence and protests accompanied all three elections, with one notable incident occurring in January 2001, when security forces killed 30 opposition supporters during a demonstration in Pemba against the conduct of the 2000 elections, which had been condemned by international observers as rife with irregularity.¹⁶ Initiatives to establish peace between the parties were embodied in agreements known as *Muafaka I*, signed in 1999, and *Muafaka II* in 2001. Neither held for long, but they set the groundwork for *Maridhiano*, a process of reconciliation spearheaded in 2009 by then president of Zanzibar, CCM's Amani Abeid Karume, and CUF's Seif Sharif Hamad, that resulted in an agreement to launch a government of national unity (GNU)

¹³ Commonwealth (2015), 'International observers express concern at the situation in Zanzibar', 29 October 2015, <http://thecommonwealth.org/media/news/international-observers-express-concern-situation-zanzibar> (accessed 31 Oct. 2015).

¹⁴ Present at the talks were CUF's presidential candidate and the former first vice-president of Zanzibar, Seif Sharif Hamad; the incumbent president of Zanzibar, Ali Mohamed Shein; the second vice-president, Seif Ali Iddi; the former president of Zanzibar, Amani Abeid Karume; and the former president of Tanzania, Ali Hassan Mwinyi.

¹⁵ Ali Mohamed Shein, Zanzibar's current CCM president, is one of the party's few politicians to hail from Pemba.

¹⁶ The Commonwealth Observer Group described those polls as 'a shambles...due to either massive incompetence or a deliberate attempt to wreck the election'. *Tanzania General Elections, 31 October 2010*, http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/commonwealth/governance/tanzania-general-elections-31-october-2010_9781849290494-en (accessed 16 Oct. 2015).

after the 2010 elections. Passed by referendum in July 2010, and thereby enshrined in Zanzibar's constitution, the first GNU was established in October 2010 as CCM's Ali Mohamed Shein became president and CUF's Hamad became Zanzibar's first vice-president. CUF's joining of the government meant there was no longer an opposition representation within the House of Representatives.

The 2015 elections were to be the first test of the success of the GNU. It was a unique undertaking as a Zanzibari-owned process that required both Karume and Hamad to overcome fierce opposition from within their respective parties and to agree to share power before an election had taken place, in contrast to similar unity governments, such as those formed in Kenya and Zimbabwe in 2008 after contentious elections. The annulment of Zanzibar's 2015 election results and the failure of subsequent talks will push the parties further apart. The 2010 constitutional amendment made power-sharing within the GNU a fixed feature of Zanzibari politics. As a result, overcoming the political impasse is necessary not only for peace on the islands, but also for the effectiveness of future Zanzibari governments. CUF's declaration that it will not take part in the March 2016 re-run leaves open the possibility that the next GNU will only nominally be a power-sharing government, with a minor party in Zanzibar entering into government with the far more-powerful CCM.

Box 3: Zanzibar's social and political history

Zanzibar's complex history, centred on the coexistence of linguistic and religious homogeneity with conflicting narratives of indigeneity, has translated into a contentious modern political scene since Tanzania returned to multiparty democracy in 1992. The islands formally entered into a union with mainland Tanzania in 1964. Prior to this, Zanzibar was ruled by an Omani Arab sultanate with influence that stretched along the East African coast, beyond Tanzania's modern-day borders. As a result of the islands' centuries-old history as a trading post, their population became more ethnically diverse than that of mainland Tanzania, with the establishment of a small but economically dominant community of Omani Arabs who were closely linked to the sultanate, alongside a Persian Shirazi community that was only loosely differentiated from the islands' black African communities. A swift but violent revolution in January 1964 overthrew the sultanate, decimating the Arab population of Zanzibar as many were killed and others fled to Oman. The resulting political dispensation led to the formation of a Revolutionary Council of Zanzibar, which negotiated the union with the mainland. Under this agreement, Zanzibar could maintain a government with authority over 'non-union matters', including issues such as health, education and the environment, but excluding matters such as foreign affairs, defence, immigration and policing.¹⁷ Concern over potential Omani influence in Zanzibar wielded by those who left the islands in 1964, alongside contrasting sentiment that those of mixed race or Arab heritage and those hailing from Pemba are targeted for discrimination, has fuelled political differences and occasional tension in Zanzibar since the union was formed.

Autonomy and the state of the union

In Zanzibar, CCM and CUF are similar on matters of policy – both promote increased development for the islands – but CUF draws most support from Pemba due to that island's chronic economic and social underdevelopment under successive CCM governments. In recent years, the fundamental difference between CCM and CUF in Zanzibar has centred on the degree of autonomy for the islands. CCM plugs into its supporters' fears of the social, economic and religious implications of a more independent Zanzibar, linked to concerns over the extent of lasting influence from those who fled to Oman after the revolution. These concerns contrast with the belief prevalent among CUF's supporters that the

¹⁷ See Articles of Union of 1964, http://www.vpo.go.tz/document_storage/articles_of_union.pdf (accessed 2 Feb. 2015).

mainland is too dominant within the union, denying Zanzibaris economic freedoms and political representation. However, a bedrock of Zanzibari national identity underlies the islands' party-political rivalry, and is particularly significant when considering the relationship between Zanzibar and the mainland. Not all Zanzibari CCM politicians express satisfaction with the status quo of the union, and high-profile defections and expulsions from the party have occurred when CCM politicians on the islands have publicly expressed their dissatisfaction with the mainland's dominance over Zanzibar.¹⁸

The constitutional review process launched in 2011 by President Kikwete was intended to regain popularity for CCM after the party saw an unprecedented drop of 20 per cent in voter support in the 2010 elections. The process was led by a Constitutional Review Commission (CRC) headed by a former prime minister and judge, Joseph Warioba, and was tasked to conduct extensive nationwide consultations.¹⁹ The drafting of a new constitution was to be informed by the principal concerns of a representative range of Tanzanians, and a final draft was to be voted on in a referendum on 30 April 2015.

The constitutional review reawakened in Zanzibar the idea of recalibrating Tanzania's structure of government in order to increase the islands' autonomy within a federal union, a notion that has repeatedly had traction since the union's formation. The idea of a three-tier government system, in which Zanzibar and the mainland would maintain their own governments and one overarching union government would be introduced, was proposed in 1992 by the Nyalali Commission, a body established by presidential decree in 1991 that set the framework for Tanzania to move towards a multiparty political system.²⁰ The idea re-emerged in 1999 as a recommendation of a subsequent constitutional commission known as the Kisanga Committee.²¹ In Zanzibar, a pledge to pursue the establishment of a three-tier government system has featured in CUF election campaigns since 1995. The support for such a constitutional change, particularly from Zanzibar, that was exposed by the CRC consultations should have been easily anticipated, but posed a problem for the CCM government as party ideology mandated the continuation of a two-government system.

The CRC reported concerns from Zanzibar, including the argument that the two-government union model undermined the islands politically. It was claimed that, because it holds responsibility for the union and for mainland Tanzania, the government based in Dar es Salaam might unfairly prioritize the mainland in decision-making and expenditure. It was also argued that the increase in the number of issues categorized as union matters since 1964 demonstrated a creeping encroachment on Zanzibar's autonomy. Finally, the CRC highlighted a perceived lack of integration of the economies of Zanzibar and mainland Tanzania, finding that Zanzibaris believed they were not sufficiently consulted over the economic issues of the union.²²

¹⁸ Hassan Nassor Moyo, a veteran Zanzibari politician who was instrumental in the formation of the union in 1964, was expelled from CCM in 2015 for breaching party ethics by allegedly calling for Zanzibar to regain its sovereignty at a CUF rally. The former Zanzibar minister for agriculture, Mansour Yussuf Himid, was expelled by CCM and defected to CUF after long questioning the structure of the union. Yussuf, I. (2015), 'Tanzania: CCM Founder Member Expelled', AllAfrica, 11 April 2015, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201504200997.html> (accessed 26 Jan. 2016); IPP Media (2011), 'Zanzibar Minister told to step down', 11 July 2011, <http://www.ippmedia.com/frontend/index.php?l=31302> (accessed 26 Jan. 2016).

¹⁹ Panapress (2011), 'Kikwete announces review of Tanzania constitution', 1 January 2011, <http://www.panapress.com/Kikwete-announces-review-of-Tanzania-constitution---13-749906-17-lang2-index.html> (accessed 1 Mar. 2015).

²⁰ Named after its chair, Francis Nyalali, who was then chief justice. The commission was established by President Ali Hassan Mwinyi in response to the debate around Tanzania's status as a single-party state and its political dispensation.

²¹ Named after its chair, Robert Kisanga, then a justice of the High Court. The committee was appointed by President Benjamin Mkapa to respond to calls for a new constitution that gained popularity in 1998. Mkapa publicly denounced the committee's proposal of a three-tier system.

²² Minde, N. (2014), 'A Beleaguered Political Marriage: The Tanganyika-Zanzibar Union and the Constitution Process in Tanzania', *Kujenga Amani*, 20 May 2014, <http://forums.ssrc.org/kujenga-amani/2014/05/20/a-beleaguered-political-marriage-the-tanganyika-zanzibar-union-and-the-constitution-process-in-tanzania/> (accessed 28 Feb. 2015).

On the mainland, the review process revealed a belief that Zanzibar had overstepped the limits of the union – including through amendments to the Zanzibari constitution in 2010, which refer to the islands as ‘sovereign’,²³ thereby implying independence – and through the maintenance of a Zanzibari flag, national anthem, constitution and government. By convention, legislation set by Tanzania’s national government is brought before Zanzibar’s House of Representatives before being passed on the islands, but this was seen by some mainlanders as placing the Zanzibari constitution above the Tanzanian one.²⁴

The CRC therefore proposed, in its first and second drafts of a new constitution issued in 2013, that Tanzania should adopt a three-tier government system in order to sustain the union. The inclusion of this suggestion in the CRC’s drafts (the second version is known as the Warioba draft after the CRC chair) proved controversial, but was a result of the open nature of the public consultations, for which opinions were invited on all political issues.²⁵ This resultant draft constitution presented the CCM government with a problem – President Kikwete had promoted the development of a ‘people’s constitution’, but was reluctant to preside over huge structural changes that could undermine his party’s political stronghold in Zanzibar.

The question of the structure of government dominated political debate until the scheduled referendum to endorse the constitution was indefinitely postponed in April 2015.

The final draft constitution presented to the national parliament in 2014 differed from the December 2013 version composed by the CRC, and was the result of alterations by the members of the constituent assembly that remained after the UKAWA boycott.²⁶ The final draft constitution contained more than 40 additional articles, including new chapters on Zanzibar’s government and land ownership. Approximately 80 per cent of the articles in the CRC’s version had been amended.²⁷ Most notably, the first chapter of the December 2013 draft, which had proposed a three-tier union, was dismissed. The question of the structure of government dominated political debate until the scheduled referendum to endorse the constitution was indefinitely postponed in April 2015.

Calls from Zanzibar for the draft of the constitution to be revisited match the interests of the mainland opposition, as ACT-Wazalendo and UKAWA have professed support for the Warioba draft. In positioning itself as the embodiment of change under President Magufuli, the new CCM government may not be able to resist calls for the long-delayed referendum on the new constitution to take place. Questions of whether this represents a ‘people’s constitution’ are likely to persist, however.

²³ Enonchong, L. (2012), ‘Tanzania’s Constitutional Review: A New Era for the Union?’, *Comparative Institutions* blog, 2 July 2012, <http://www.comparativeconstitutions.org/2012/07/tanzanias-constitutional-review-new-era.html> (accessed 28 Feb. 2015).

²⁴ Minde (2014), ‘A Beleaguered Political Marriage’.

²⁵ According to media reports, in Zanzibar 34 per cent of consultation participants wished to retain a two-government structure, 0.1 per cent opted for one government and 60 per cent supported a three-tier union. On the mainland 24 per cent preferred the current two-government structure, 13 per cent wanted one government and 61 per cent wanted a three-tier union Kimboz, F. (2013), ‘Why Katiba team has proposed three-tier union again’, *The Citizen*, 31 December 2013, <http://www.thecitizen.co.tz/News/Warioba-Why-we-have-proposed-3-govts-again/-/1840392/2130038/-/gd0klf/-/index.html> (accessed 14 Apr. 2015). But there were uncertainties surrounding the way that the CRC interpreted reported data. For more on this, see Taylor, B. (2014), ‘What do Tanzanians really think of the three governments idea?’, *mtega blog*, Mar. 2014, <http://mtega.com/2014/03/what-do-tanzanians-really-think-of-the-three-governments-idea/> (accessed 30 Jan. 2016).

²⁶ Constituent assembly members from the opposition and civil society voiced concerns over interpretation of its mandate, arguing that it could only review, not alter, the draft that was presented by the CRC. This was overruled.

²⁷ Of the 233 articles in the CRC’s December 2013 draft, 188 were amended. Majura, M. (2014), ‘Tanzania: Final draft of proposed new Constitution tabled’, IPP Media, 25 September 2014, <http://www.constitutionnet.org/news/tanzania-final-draft-proposed-new-constitution-tabled> (accessed 4 Mar. 2015).

Although overshadowed by the discussion of a new structure of government, other issues tackled in Tanzania's postponed draft constitution could have positive outcomes for Zanzibar. These include provisions for land ownership, particularly for women, the chance for Zanzibar to gain increased control of potential oil revenue from offshore deposits, and the inclusion of an article that would effectively permit Zanzibar's government to borrow money domestically and internationally to finance its mandated activities.²⁸ If implemented, these could do much to speed up the pace of development on the islands.

Although CCM and CUF in Zanzibar have differed over the extent of the islands' autonomy, and international observers expressed fears that the violence that surrounded previous elections might reignite after the suspension of the 2015 polls, it is pertinent that Zanzibar President Ali Mohamed Shein and CUF's Seif Sharif Hamad repeatedly assert that their intention is to strengthen the union with mainland Tanzania. For CUF, this strength is sought through the introduction of a tripartite government structure, while for CCM it is believed that the union can be solidified through the status quo. Despite the parties differing in their approach, this shared objective could be the spark that inspires renewed reconciliation. Achieving this, though, will depend heavily on the involvement and prioritization of Zanzibar by the upper echelons of Tanzania's leadership.

²⁸ Ibid.

4. Security Through Service Delivery

Analyses of security tend to focus closely on ‘hard’ threats such as the risks of internationally-inspired terrorism or political discontent that manifests in flashpoints of violence. Consideration of such threats, while relevant to Tanzania, should not obscure the importance of other slow-burning potential challenges to its continued stability. The capacity to provide education, employment and other public services will need to increase rapidly in a country with a high population growth rate and economic dependence on agriculture and electricity from hydropower, which can be inconsistent due to climate change. The dissatisfaction of young people who feel distanced from mainstream politics and are unable to find work can foment an environment in which insecurity takes hold. Guaranteeing democratic space so that dissenting views can be expressed through robust but legal means, such as a free media and independent civil society organizations, is important for protecting civil rights and enabling the security necessary to build Tanzania’s ambitious development plans.

The new government has marked increased taxation, stringent anti-corruption measures and improvements to the livelihoods of the poor, particularly in rural areas, as priorities, but challenges lie in the capacity for implementation within the public sector and in how security concerns are balanced with freedoms of the press and of expression.²⁹

Development and poverty reduction

Tanzania remains one of the 25 poorest countries in the world, with 43.5 per cent of the population living on less than \$1.25 per day, despite the efforts of a series of development-minded governments. Successive policies focusing on development, based upon the socialist tenets of Nyerere’s legacy, have been hampered by ideologically driven ideas that have been pursued despite evidence that they did not work,³⁰ as well as by petty and grand corruption that has hindered public service delivery and the development of the private sector.

More recent poverty reduction plans, including the National Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategies known as *Mkukuta I* and *II* that ran from 2005 to 2015, were recognized as realistic in their aims by Tanzania’s international donors and have enjoyed some hard-won gains. The number of Tanzanians living below the poverty line fell by 5.8 percent between 2007 and 2012, an achievement noted

²⁹ The passing of a Cyber Crimes Act and a Statistics Bill in June 2015, late in President Kikwete’s tenure, raised concerns that Tanzanian media and civil society organisations might be targeted for prosecution if they publish information deemed to be ‘false, deceptive, misleading or inaccurate’ by the government, Cyber Crimes Act 2015, Part 1. No. 16, <http://www.parliament.go.tz/polis/PAMS/docs/1-2015-4.pdf> (accessed 6 Mar. 2016). In response to criticism, the National Bureau of Statistics released a clarification of the Statistics Bill, arguing that NGOs would not be penalised for producing statistics, but these would not be official unless they correspond with UN rules: Statement Of Clarification On Misconception Of Statistics Act 2015, National Bureau of Statistics, <http://www.nbs.go.tz/nbstz/index.php/english/gdp/88-statement-of-clarification-on-misconception-of-statistics-act-2015> (accessed 6 Mar. 2016). Despite strident signs of reform in the public sector after President Magufuli’s election, the seizure of computer equipment from the Tanzania Civil Society Consortium on Election Observation (Tacceo), an independent group monitoring election results in October 2015, and the banning of the tabloid newspaper *Mawio* in January 2016 indicated that official attitudes towards the media and civil society would remain consistent. ‘Dar civil society’s plea to Magufuli’, *The Citizen*, 21 November 2015, <http://www.thecitizen.co.tz/News/Dar-civil-society-s-plea-to-Magufuli/-/1840340/2965310/-/epvsvd/-/index.html> (accessed 6 Mar. 2016)

³⁰ For more on the pursuit of agricultural collectivization and the maintenance of state-owned enterprises and industries in the 1970s and 1980s, despite their detrimental impact on Tanzania’s poorest people, see Lofchie, M. (2014), *The Political Economy of Tanzania: Decline and Recovery*, Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.

by the World Bank as the first significant decline in 20 years.³¹ Overall, however, development has been undermined by a lack of strategy and capacity for implementation. Late in President Kikwete's tenure there was a shift in Tanzania's development approach. The Big Results Now (BRN) initiative, launched in 2013, was Kikwete's final flagship development plan. Inspired by Malaysia's successful development model, it generated initial donor enthusiasm for its aim to bridge the gap between policy planning and effective implementation through detail-oriented interventions on key issues, and its introduction of external donor and private-sector expertise into development planning in six target sectors.³² While early assessments of the success of BRN have been mixed, some of Tanzania's major donor partners noted that the programme's inclusive nature, where experts from outside government were incorporated into planning groups, prompted an ease in interaction with ministries and thereby improved collaboration on development priorities.³³

Complex bureaucracy and poor delivery have stalled development, as has ministerial focus on outputs rather than measurable improvement.

Complex bureaucracy and poor delivery have stalled development, as has ministerial focus on outputs rather than measurable improvement. President Magufuli has made clear his prioritization of improvements to civil service performance, but while the spate of sackings and suspensions of senior individuals has made headlines, their replacement by other long-standing civil servants indicates that potentially useful changes to working culture may be slow to emerge. Enhancing bureaucratic capability will take time, and better monitoring and evaluation of the progress of public service delivery requires greater prioritization by donor partners and political leaders.

The key to driving continued development will be the streamlining of objectives between donors and the government, improvements to the capacity of the public sector, and an increase in the country's ability to raise domestic revenue – itself dependent on the capacity of the private sector. Delivery also remains highly dependent on funding for the local authorities that are on the front line of service provision. Reduced finance for local government bodies in 2013–14 slowed delivery on education and health services.³⁴ The success of development initiatives embodied in the country's codified national growth strategy, known as Vision 2025,³⁵ could be limited if budget reductions continue.

³¹ Belghith, N. and Gaddis, I. (2015), Tanzania Mainland Poverty Assessment, Executive Summary, <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2015/05/24448522/tanzania-mainland-poverty-assessment-executive-summary> (accessed 2 Mar. 2016).

³² Early assessments of BRN's impact on the selected sectors (agriculture, education, energy, resource mobilization, transport and water) found that the approach made small improvements.

³³ Author interview carried out under the Chatham House Rule, Dar es Salaam, 9 October 2015.

³⁴ Cunningham, V., Haji M., Morisset, J., Tanzania economic update: the elephant in the room - unlocking the potential of the tourism industry for Tanzanians p. X, World Bank Economic Update, January 2015. <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2015/01/23886748/tanzania-economic-update-elephant-room-unlocking-potential-tourism-industry-tanzanians> (accessed 14 Apr. 2015).

³⁵ *The Tanzania Development Vision 2025*, <http://www.tzonline.org/pdf/theTanzaniadevelopmentvision.pdf>.

Box 4: Tanzania development indicators, 2014

Population growth rate	3.2%
Urban population growth rate	5.5%
Population under 15 years old	45.2%
Under 5 mortality rate (per 1,000)	50.5
Access to services	
Population with access to improved sanitation facilities	15%
Population with access to electricity	36%
Rural population with access to electricity	11%
Internet users (per 100 people)	4.9
Education	
Primary school net enrolment rate	98%
Lower secondary school net enrolment rate	39%
Upper secondary school net enrolment rate	4%

Sources: World Bank Development Indicators; World Bank SABER Country Report; Tanzania National Bureau of Statistics.

A demographic dividend?

At current rates of growth, the population of 53 million is projected to increase more than fivefold by 2100, making Tanzania one of the 10 largest countries in the world by the close of this century.³⁶ The relationship between population growth and economic development is complex, but it is undeniable that the tripling of the population since independence has placed pressure on the economic and social infrastructure, which has not expanded to keep pace. Currently, close to half of the population is below working age and so unable to formally contribute to the economy.³⁷ That said, as these young people reach adulthood, Tanzania could see an economic boom. To achieve this, the expansion of its working-age population will require appropriate preparation and guidance, with sustained improvements to skills provision, equitable education for boys and girls, and employment opportunities for skilled and unskilled workers. This is crucial as the country appears to have reached its peak youthfulness and so will not gain another chance to cultivate a population that can work to its maximum potential.

For the new government, there will also be political implications of the country's youth bulge. No less than 57 per cent of voters in the 2015 elections were under the age of 35.³⁸ By the 2020 elections youth participation in the vote will be even higher. A government that improves outcomes for young Tanzanians over the next five years could secure loyal political support.

³⁶ The United Nations projects Tanzania's population to be 299 million by 2100: United Nations (2015), *World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision, Key Findings and Advance Tables*, New York, NY: United Nations (accessed 3 Feb. 2016.) Table S3, p. 24.

³⁷ In 2015, 45.2 per cent of Tanzanians were under the age of 15. Ibid., Table S6, p. 30.

³⁸ Uchaguzi Tanzania (2015), 'Registered voters by age', <http://www.uchaguzitanzania.co.tz/analysis/demographics/registered-voters-by-age/> (accessed 23 Oct. 2015).

Under President Kikwete, the government demonstrated its awareness of the economic challenge of rapid population growth, as the national population policy issued in 2006 noted that the demands of a youthful population for social services drew resources that could be saved for future investments. For President Magufuli's government, the policy's stipulation that in the short term 'rapid population growth in the context of poverty eradication reduces the possibility of attaining sustainable growth',³⁹ will hold true but can be mitigated through innovative methods for increasing delivery for a young population. In a time of austerity, innovation could be fast-tracked through deeper involvement of the private sector in reaching for swift and positive development outcomes. For example, the private sector contributes approximately one-third of Tanzania's healthcare provision but remains separate from the public health service, running in parallel, with little transparency or collaboration between the two.⁴⁰ Moves to enable private-sector participation will require a concrete step away from public-sector suspicion of private business that lingers from Tanzania's socialist days.

Educational provision

The idea of education as a driver of self-reliance was a key part of Nyerere's socialism, but this has not resulted in a legacy of sustained educational improvement, despite the fact that it was prioritized under President Kikwete. Tanzania met the UN's Millennium Development Goal 2 of achieving universal primary education early, and demonstrated improvements in educational access that outstripped the rest of Africa.⁴¹ However, beneath positive headlines are indications that the educational system is under strain. While access to education has widened, schools are under pressure from admission rates that increase by up to 10 per cent year-on-year. The swift provision of universal primary education obscures the low level of secondary and tertiary educational achievement and, as in the health sector, there is little coordination between private providers of secondary education and the public sector. Tanzania has a net enrolment rate of 98 per cent at primary level, 39 per cent at the lower secondary level, and 4 per cent at the upper secondary level.⁴² The quality of education has not improved in conjunction with educational expansion; teacher absenteeism and mass examination failures continue to be problems.⁴³

In February 2015, President Kikwete launched a new education and training policy, marking the first update since 1995. This increased spending on education to 20 per cent of the government's budget, extended the right to free, compulsory education to 10 years of study, unified the curriculum and limited the fees that private schools can charge. Much of the attention on the policy focused on its intention to replace English with Kiswahili as the language of instruction in secondary schools, a policy already enforced at primary level. Critics argued that moving away from English would

³⁹ Ministry of Planning, Economy and Empowerment, Tanzania (2006), *National Population Policy*, p. 5, http://www.africanchildforum.org/cfr/policy%20per%20country/tanzania/tanzania_population_2006_en.pdf (accessed 14 Apr. 2015).

⁴⁰ GIZ (2014), *The Private Sector in Health in Tanzania: An Overview*, Bonn: GIZ, http://www.tgpsh.or.tz/fileadmin/documents/Health_Financing/Overview_Private_Sector_in_Health_in_Tanzania_SN_Final_Jan_2014.pdf (accessed 31 Jan. 2016).

⁴¹ Lee, L. (2013), '21st Century Progress in Africa: Achieving MDG 2 in Tanzania', *Impatient Optimists* blog, Seattle, WA: Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, 4 November 2013, <http://www.impatientoptimists.org/Posts/2013/10/21st-Century-Progress-in-Africa-Achieving-MDG-2-in-Tanzania> (accessed 20 Mar. 2015).

⁴² World Bank Group (2015), SABER Country report, *Tanzania: Engaging the Private Sector in Education*, Washington, DC: World Bank Group, http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2015/10/13/090224b08313e881/1_0/Rendered/PDF/SABER0engaging0port000Tanzania02015.pdf (accessed 3 Feb. 2016).

⁴³ A 2012 study found that while 68 per cent of schoolchildren could pass a numeracy test, literacy rates were much worse with only 35 per cent passing an English test and 53 per cent passing Kiswahili. Teacher attendance rates were 82 per cent. 'Fact 4: Differences between literacy and numeracy skills are largest amongst Tanzanian children', in Uwezo (2014), *Are Our Children Learning? Literacy and Numeracy Across East Africa 2013*, Nairobi: Uwezo, p. 14, <http://www.uwezo.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/2013-Annual-Report-Final-Web-version.pdf> (accessed 1 Mar. 2015).

undermine Tanzania's ability to access the global economy.⁴⁴ They also pointed to the likelihood that implementation might take so long as to make the policy unsuitable for the country's future context.⁴⁵

Population growth also has consequences for the cost of this scale of education provision, but the need to compete within a rapidly integrating region makes educational improvement vital to fuelling Tanzania's development and economic growth. A much-publicized study in 2014 by the East African Business Council and the Inter-University Council for East Africa ranked Tanzanian graduates as the second-least employable in East Africa, with 61 per cent assessed as having no basic job market skills, compared to 51 per cent of Kenyan graduates.⁴⁶

Population growth also has consequences for the cost of this scale of education provision, but the need to compete within a rapidly integrating region makes educational improvement vital to fuelling Tanzania's development and economic growth.

President Magufuli's selection of a former executive secretary of the National Examinations Council of Tanzania (NECTA), Joyce Ndalichako, to head the education ministry indicates an intention to improve the sector through technocratic means. Ndalichako's history of distancing NECTA from political interference is a positive indication that this method could deliver results.⁴⁷ Tanzania also faces complicating challenges – school access is better in urban areas, but as the country has a majority rural population, improved educational delivery outside urban centres will make the biggest difference overall.

⁴⁴ Lugongo, B. (2015), 'Bye Std VII exams, English; Karibu Kiswahili in studies', *The Citizen*, 14 February 2015, <http://www.thecitizen.co.tz/News/national/Bye-Std-VII-exams--English--Karibu-Kiswahili-in-studies/-/1840392/2623428/-/item/0/-/ws67puz/-/index.html> (accessed 14 Apr. 2015).

⁴⁵ Atfield, I. (2015), 'Education Policy Lab', UK Department for International Development, 23 February 2015, <https://dfid.blog.gov.uk/2015/02/23/education-policy-lab/> (accessed 11 Apr. 2015).


⁴⁶ Onyango, E. (2015), 'Are Tanzanian graduates unemployable?', IPP Media, 25 February 2015, <http://www.ippmedia.com/frontend/?l=77872> (accessed 1 Feb. 2016).

⁴⁷ Ndalichako's extended leave of absence from NECTA was rumoured to be due to her frustration at political interference in examination results. Matandiko, K. (2016), 'Politics "put education quality on deathbed"', *The Citizen*, 6 January 2016, <http://www.thecitizen.co.tz/magazine/politicalreforms/Politics--put-education-quality-on-deathbed/-/1843776/3023096/-/qsxh3fz/-/index.html> (accessed 1 Feb. 2016).

5. Economic Governance

Tanzania’s economic advantage lies in the diversity of its exploitable natural resources. In addition to recent gas finds, the country is a world-class mineral producer and a key agricultural player in East Africa and it has wildlife and geography that cater to a valuable and growing tourism industry. Recent economic growth has stayed at around 7 per cent annually, despite the country’s exposure to volatility in international prices of food, gold and energy. Since 2011, Tanzania’s annual growth rate has outstripped that of Kenya and Uganda,⁴⁸ and it became the top destination for foreign direct investment (FDI) in East Africa in 2014. However, perceptions of corruption may have inhibited growth by dissuading more foreign engagement.⁴⁹ In 2014, the country’s GDP was rebased, with the new calculation reflecting that Tanzania’s GDP was almost a third larger than previously estimated. As a result, new figures for average annual GDP per capita moved Tanzania closer to the middle-income country status that forms part of its development ambitions as set out in Vision 2025.

Figure 1: Key contributors to Tanzania’s GDP, 2014




Source: Elaborated from Annex 2, World Bank Economic Update, 7th Edition, July 2015.

⁴⁸ Tanzania economic update: the elephant in the room - unlocking the potential of the tourism industry for Tanzanians Fig 8, World Bank Economic Update, January 2015 (accessed 19 Aug. 2015).

⁴⁹ However, corruption remains a constraint on FDI across East Africa. Transparency International’s corruption perception index places Tanzania 119th out of 175 countries, above its neighbours, with Mozambique holding exactly the same score, and Kenya and Uganda ranking 145th and 142nd respectively. Transparency International, Visualising the Corruption Perception Index 2014, <https://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/infographic/regional/sub-saharan-africa> (accessed 5 Mar. 2015).

Figure 2: Tanzania’s year-on-year GDP growth, 2006–15



Source: Bank of Tanzania, Monthly Economic Review, 2006–15.

Expansion in services, construction, transport, trade, finance and insurance has contributed to Tanzania’s recent economic growth,⁵⁰ but local and foreign firms report that the business environment could be improved.⁵¹ Businesses’ concerns centre on capacity issues, including the unreliability of power supply and the lack of road and rail infrastructure; and on policy deficiencies, such as the complicated tax system. These anxieties are only exacerbated by the inconsistent application of regulations by civil servants.

Tanzania’s dependence on hydropower for electricity production leaves it highly vulnerable to drought, which has been a recurring event in recent years. In 2015, hydropower contributed 35 per cent of generating capacity, down from 98 per cent in 2002,⁵² demonstrating the need to diversify in order to ensure better energy provision for growing demand from private domestic consumption and to support business growth dependent on reliable electricity. Electrification is currently low, with 36 per cent of the population having access to electricity in 2015, though that figure is only 11 per cent in rural areas.⁵³ Demand is expected to grow to 4,700 MW by 2025 and to 7,400 MW by 2035,⁵⁴ far outstripping the 1,500 MW that is currently produced. Tanzania receives foreign support to develop this capacity, most notably through the US Power Africa scheme that financed the development of the Kinyerezi gas-fired power-plant, launched in October 2015, which is intended to eventually use gas from Mtwara to generate 150 MW. Power Africa financing will also aid the development of solar and hydroelectric energy, with the ambition of helping Tanzania to reach its target generating capacity of 2,780 MW by the end of 2016.

Incidences of political corruption have tended to occur in the energy sector.⁵⁵ Since 1995, eight ministers of energy and minerals have been sacked or resigned in relation to corruption scandals.

⁵⁰ Bank of Tanzania (2015), *Monetary Policy Statement*, June 2015 (accessed 30 Jan. 2016).

⁵¹ Author interviews, Dar es Salaam, September and October 2015.

⁵² African Development Bank Group (2015), *Renewable Energy in Africa: Tanzania Country Profile*, Abidjan: African Development Bank Group, http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Generic-Documents/Renewable_Energy_in_Africa_-_Tanzania.pdf (accessed 1 Feb. 2016).

⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ One prominent exception was the controversy over the procurement in 2002 of unnecessary military radar from BAE Systems: ‘BAE Systems in Tanzania education payout’, *BBC News*, 15 March 2012, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-17384198> (accessed 2 Mar. 2016).

The impact of recurring drought on hydropower, along with the resultant short-term emergency fixes embarked on by the state power supplier, TANESCO, has provided opportunities for illicit gains by political elites and public-sector officials through bribery related to the issuance of tenders. In 2012, TANESCO's former CEO, William Mhando, was sacked following accusations of abuse of office, the inflation of tenders, and the illegal awarding of contracts to his family's company. Compounding the financial impact of corruption is the significant scale of TANESCO's debt to private suppliers of fuel and power, a result of the expensive alternatives required to maintain electricity supply during hydropower shortages. The escrow account at the centre of the most recent scandal was created after a disagreement over capacity charges between TANESCO and IPTL, a Malaysian-Tanzanian joint venture power supply company. President Magufuli's clean-up of underperforming state institutions has not yet affected TANESCO, but the company is likely to be a target. Prior to his election Magufuli alleged that TANESCO employees were purposefully sabotaging dams in order to cut electricity supply so that they could receive kickbacks from fuel importation.

In the longer term, President Magufuli will preside over the implementation of the Electricity Supply Industry Reform Strategy and Roadmap, which runs to 2025 and will include splitting TANESCO into separate generation, transmission and distribution firms. This division is scheduled to be underway by 2017. Persuading the private sector to fund the roadmap's realization will be central to securing sustainability in energy provision.

The urgent need to increase revenue collection reflects the country's goal of reaching middle-income country status by 2025, at a time when aid inflows are declining and public service expenditure needs to rise. A coherent and 'business-friendly taxation system'⁵⁶ could eliminate opportunities for corruption created by the complexity of levies and taxes currently in place, and support wider growth and job provision. The majority of taxation revenue comes from income tax, value-added tax (VAT), import duties and excise tax, but there is a plethora of exemptions and multiple levies applied to certain goods that complicate the process of taxation and leave it susceptible to corruption.

In addition to the need to increase taxation overall is the need to diversify revenue collection from the current focus on large, often foreign, enterprises based in Dar es Salaam. These enterprises provide 88 per cent of tax revenue, despite generating only 17 per cent of GDP.

In addition to the need to increase taxation overall is the need to diversify revenue collection from the current focus on large, often foreign, enterprises based in Dar es Salaam. These enterprises provide 88 per cent of tax revenue, despite generating only 17 per cent of GDP.⁵⁷ The new government has signalled that it will take a hard-line approach in order to reduce tax evasion, and Minister for Finance and Planning Phillip Mpango announced in parliament his intention to increase domestic tax revenue by 15 per cent in 2016–17. President Magufuli and Prime Minister Majaliwa have focused on targeting deficiencies and potential corruption over tax excised by customs officials in Dar es Salaam. In November 2015, the head of the Tanzania Revenue Authority, Rished Bade, was suspended after nearly 350

⁵⁶ Cunningham, V., Haji, M., Morisset, J., 'Tanzania economic update: the elephant in the room – unlocking the potential of the tourism industry for Tanzanians' p. X, *World Bank Economic Update*, January 2015. <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2015/01/23886748/tanzania-economic-update-elephant-room-unlocking-potential-tourism-industry-tanzanians> p. XIII, *World Bank Economic Update*, January 2015 (accessed 19 Aug. 2015).

⁵⁷ See 'Fig 20: Sector concentration of VAT collection on domestic transactions, 2012/13' in World Bank Group (2015), *Tanzanian Economic Update: Why Should Tanzanians Pay Taxes? The unavoidable need to finance economic development*, Washington, DC: World Bank Group, <http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/Africa/Tanzania/Report/tanzania-economic-update-why-should-tanzanians-pay-taxes-the-unavoidable-need-to-finance-economic-development.pdf> (accessed 31 Jan. 2016).

containers, worth \$37 million, disappeared from inland depots that serve Dar es Salaam port. During a follow-up visit to Dar es Salaam port, Prime Minister Majaliwa sacked more officials after finding that an additional 2,400 containers had been fraudulently allowed to pass through without being taxed.

While tax evasion is an issue, the socialist legacy of economic nationalism and centralized control has also coloured government relations with certain sectors. The discourse with the private sector surrounding the development of offshore gas provides a pertinent case study on the need to establish trust between firms and policy-makers in order to harness the country's significant, but time-sensitive, economic potential.

Gas and the governance of the extractive sector

Commercial production of natural gas for domestic consumption began in Tanzania in 2004, when exploitation began following discoveries on Songo Songo Island in 1974 and Mnazi Bay in 1982. In 2010, offshore deposits were discovered approximately 100 kilometres from the southern coast. After an eighth offshore find by Statoil-Exxon Mobil in March 2015, Tanzania now has an estimated 55.08 trillion cubic feet of gas. If deemed commercially viable this gas would come online around 2030, bringing up to \$6 billion in revenues to the country annually.

Construction associated with gas development is likely to bring significant investment over the next 15 years, potentially reaching \$5 billion annually. The scale of these finds could turn Tanzania into the third-largest producer of liquefied natural gas (LNG) in the world. But to harness this great economic potential requires a move away from the brinkmanship that has characterized discussions between firms and the government.

Although Tanzania has been a gas producer since 2004, the discovery of major deposits of offshore gas in 2010 led to a greater governance focus on hydrocarbons. The direction of policy has been set by the Ministry of Energy and Minerals, but disruption and delay to the development of a workable regulatory framework have led to disparate messaging from various government ministries and official agencies. This uncertainty, in combination with a fall in global oil and gas prices and changes in the leadership of the ministry, as a result of the IPTL escrow account scandal,⁵⁸ contributed to a stalemate from mid-2014 that has pushed back investment decisions on gas extraction and the construction of an LNG plant in Lindi from 2015–16 to 2018,⁵⁹ at the earliest.

Tanzania's commodities are a prominent political issue, and particular sensitivity lies around the negotiation of contracts with international extractive firms. The Mining Act, updated in 2010, includes provisions to increase the royalties payable to the government. It also stipulates that companies should list on the Dar es Salaam Stock Exchange.⁶⁰ Despite this, the renegotiation of mining contracts was used as a campaigning issue by presidential candidates in the 2015 elections, particularly during visits to districts close to the Geita and North Mara gold mines.⁶¹

⁵⁸ Minister of Energy and Minerals Sospeter Muhongo resigned in January 2015 after allegations of his involvement in the IPTL scandal. He maintained that he was 'incorruptible' and had not participated in graft. In a surprise development, Muhongo was reappointed to the position by President Magufuli in December 2015.

⁵⁹ Hundsbæk Pedersen, R. and Bofin, P. (2015), *The politics of gas contract negotiations in Tanzania: a review*, Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, p. 11 (accessed 31 Oct. 2015).

⁶⁰ The largest gold producer in Tanzania, Acacia Mining, listed on the Dar es Salaam stock exchange in 2011.

⁶¹ Jacob, M. (2015), 'ACT-Wazalendo pledges economic reforms', *Daily News*, 22 October 2015, <http://www.dailynews.co.tz/index.php/home-news/43441-act-wazalendo-pledges-economic-reforms> (accessed 31 Oct. 2015); Mtulya, A. (2015), 'Lowassa reiterates pledge to review mining contracts', *The Citizen*, 13 October 2015: <http://www.thecitizen.co.tz/News/Lowassa-reiterates-pledge-to-review-mining-contracts/-/1840406/2912590/-/11lubu0/-/index.html> (accessed 16 Oct. 2015).

The opposition, and parts of the media, voiced concerns that the government may not have the capability to negotiate its gas contracts on a level playing field. These accusations were based on the early outcomes of negotiations with mining companies, in which Tanzania is strongly believed to have received an unfair deal.⁶² Differences have also arisen over which sectors of society will benefit from gas and minerals (and what form any benefits might take), and the concerns of external players that the weight given to local content may drive policy towards resource nationalism.

In 2014, tension arose between the legislature and the executive as the PAC accused the government of undue opacity in its contracts with oil companies. This culminated in the arrests of senior managers of Tanzania Petroleum Development Corporation for failing to release 26 gas contracts for scrutiny by the PAC. This was exacerbated by the leak of an addendum from a contract with the Norwegian oil firm Statoil in the same year, which was initially interpreted as renegeing on the royalty amounts owed to the Tanzanian government as set out in a model production-sharing agreement.

An energy policy uniting all regulations relating to the oil, gas and power sectors is due for release in 2016, but the wording of the national policy on natural gas (also referred to as the downstream policy), passed by the cabinet in 2013, is indicative of what the new policy may contain. Most pointedly, the 2013 policy repeatedly emphasizes that gas should be extracted primarily to serve the needs of the population, stating that ‘Natural Gas will be exported when domestic market has been satisfied’,⁶³ a position reiterated by the then energy minister George Simbachawene in March 2015. However, World Bank comments on the policy draft warned that the policy’s clear preference for gas production to feed domestic consumption could discourage the investor interest in offshore development needed to finance expensive deepwater extraction.⁶⁴

The scale of funding needed to develop Tanzania’s offshore gas has driven private-sector calls for a predictable investment climate. Brinkmanship merely dents the needed trust between private firms looking to invest billions of dollars and a government that they suspect may move the goalposts once they are committed. President Magufuli’s pledge to speed up policy decision-making is an acknowledgment that there will be no decision on whether to extract offshore gas until the new government makes clear its policy priorities and all aspects of the regulatory framework are made public. Even though no significant revenue from the gas will be forthcoming until at least 2030, five years after the maximum tenure of President Magufuli, overcoming the impasse with those invested in the hydrocarbon industry within the first year of his presidency will be vital to ensuring that the gas can be monetized.

Economic diversification for balanced growth

Dar es Salaam is one of the fastest-growing cities in the world. Between 2002 and 2012, its population – now 4.2 million – almost doubled, and the city is projected to grow beyond 10 million inhabitants, reaching mega-city status, within the next 15 years.⁶⁵ Urbanization could drive up demand for the services sector, but the consequences of a huge youth population coupled with

⁶² Natural Resource Governance Institute, ‘Tanzania: extractive industries’, <http://www.resourcegovernance.org/countries/africa/tanzania/extractive-industries> (accessed 31 Oct. 2015).

⁶³ Government of Tanzania (2013), *The National Natural Gas Policy of Tanzania – 2013*, p. 4, http://www.tanzania.go.tz/egov_uploads/documents/Natural_Gas_Policy_-_Approved_sw.pdf (accessed 5 Mar. 2015).

⁶⁴ World Bank (2013), ‘Comments on Tanzania’s Natural Gas Policy’, p. 1, http://www.tzdpd.or.tz/fileadmin/documents/dpg_internal/dpg_main/DPG_Main_2013/DPG_Main_April_2013/Letter_to_Min_of_Energy_PS_Maswi_-_COMMENTS_on_the_draft_Gas_Policy.pdf (accessed 5 Mar. 2015).

⁶⁵ UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2014), *World Urbanization Prospects: The 2014 Revision – Highlights*, New York, NY: UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, p. 14, <http://esa.un.org/unpd/wup/Highlights/WUP2014-Highlights.pdf> (accessed 1 Feb. 2016).

unmanaged urban growth mean that a young person of working age in Dar es Salaam is over six times more likely to be unemployed than one residing in a rural area.⁶⁶ Unemployment for those with a secondary level of education is higher than for those without, implying that secure skilled jobs remain extremely hard to come by.

Growth in services should not overshadow the potential for increased productivity in more labour-intensive sectors. Balancing the development of services with improvement to the traditional drivers of economic growth requires evidence-based policy-making that identifies the areas of greatest need and greatest potential. Agriculture, in particular, has huge potential to fuel sustainable economic growth and, as a labour-intensive sector, also to provide much needed employment. Agriculture employs 77 per cent of Tanzania's workforce, but the sector's output has grown by only 4 per cent since 2005.⁶⁷ Without private-sector involvement, needed development may be uncomfortably reminiscent of the failed government-driven agricultural policies developed in the first 20 years of independence. Public-private partnerships such as those encouraged through the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor will therefore play an important role, but again they require more attractive terms for private-sector investment.

During President Magufuli's tenure, the government will have to ensure the smooth implementation of policies that set the groundwork for the private sector to play a role in aiding service delivery, improving the construction of needed infrastructure and providing jobs. A unified approach to economic governance – encompassing the government's standing commitments to better provision of electricity, increased use of green energy, transparency and improvements in agriculture and infrastructure – could do much to speed up development.

⁶⁶ Gaddis, I., Wane, W., Morisset, J. (2013), 'Youth in Tanzania: a growing uneducated labor force', Africa Can End Poverty blog, World Bank, 4 April 2013, <http://blogs.worldbank.org/african/youth-in-tanzania-a-growing-uneducated-labor-force> (accessed 19 Aug. 2015).

⁶⁷ US Department of State (2015), '2015 Investment Climate Statement – Tanzania', June 2015, p. 4, <http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2015/244396.htm> (accessed 1 Feb. 2016).

6. Regional Role and International Relations

Divided loyalties? Tanzania between the EAC and SADC

Tanzania is a member of the East African Community (EAC) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and has been described as dragging its feet in both. Both the EAC and SADC share the aim of deep cross-border economic integration, but this runs counter to Tanzania's domestic economic policies, which remain influenced by historical protectionism and ambitions for self-sufficiency. Tanzania's cautious approach to economic integration overshadows its regional political importance, centred on the impact of the country's role as a quiet mediator in conflicts in East and Central Africa. Where Tanzania's mediation has seen success, this has been secured through its leaders' lack of bombast, and the country's reputation for democratic elections and relatively good governance. Tanzanian efforts to encourage peace talks in Burundi have bolstered the work of the EAC's lead mediator, President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, whose authority could otherwise be undermined in a situation relating to Burundi's President Pierre Nkurunziza breaching his term limits, as Museveni has been in power for 30 years.

But Tanzania's approach to the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), which has more complex regional implications, has met with resistance. This implies that Tanzania remains unable to compete with East Africa's political heavyweights. President Magufuli's appointment of Augustine Mahiga as minister of foreign relations and international cooperation may change this dynamic. Mahiga's experience, as former special representative of the UN secretary-general for Somalia and representative of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in the Great Lakes and Liberia, gives him authority and familiarity with regional and international organizations which will put Tanzania in good stead during his chairmanship of the EAC's Council of Ministers in 2016. Former president Kikwete's appointment as the African Union's special envoy for Libya in January 2016 denotes continental recognition of the valuable role that Tanzania has played in mediation.

Tanzania's commitment to SADC is seated in the country's role as a supporter of the liberation movements of southern African countries, and in its history as a front-line state against apartheid in South Africa. Tanzania hosted members of southern Africa's nascent liberation movements in the 1960s,⁶⁸ and its current status as a host to 193,000 refugees from Burundi,⁶⁹ the DRC and Rwanda is a legacy of its long history of welcoming refugees, including from pre-independence Mozambique and Namibia. Although Tanzania remains a compliant member of SADC – whose executive secretary, Stergomena Lawrence Tax, is Tanzanian – the country's ease within it may be influenced by the organization's slow-moving integration. SADC has failed to meet the deadlines for its integration milestones – by 2015, it was supposed to have established a common market with the aim of forming a monetary union with a single currency by 2018. Instead, SADC remains at the first stage of its integration plans, and so far has only established a free-trade area. Tanzania participates

⁶⁸ For example, Mozambique's FRELIMO was founded in Dar es Salaam in 1962 and South Africa's African National Congress established a training centre in Morogoro in 1965. Tanzania also supported liberation movements in Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola.

⁶⁹ Since April 2015, 126,000 Burundians fleeing political violence have sought refuge in Tanzania, joining 64,000 refugees mostly from the DRC. The government has re-opened three refugee camps in Kigoma region to deal with the expected continued arrival of 1,500 Burundians each week in 2016.

in this, but has derogations on tariffs for sugar and paper products, thereby keeping some protection for its economy.

The EAC's faster-moving integration process is a greater challenge to Tanzania's economic stance within the region. In 2010, a customs union came into force and a common market protocol was enacted. The protocol establishing groundwork for a monetary union was adopted in 2013, and the EAC retains the vision of introducing a single East African currency by 2024. These markers of integration are intended to be the building blocks for an eventual political federation. The speed of economic integration has been fuelled by the most prominent EAC members: Rwanda, Uganda and Kenya.⁷⁰ Due to the dominant political personalities of the presidents of these three countries, in 2013 they began to be referred to as the 'coalition of the willing' because of their united vision for fast-tracked integration, particularly of road and rail infrastructure along the Northern Corridor (an economically important trade and transport route linking Mombasa to eastern DRC, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi), freedom of movement of citizens across borders and planned development of infrastructure to support nascent oil projects in Kenya and Uganda. Tanzania and Burundi have had far less influence over the recent direction of the EAC. For a period in 2013–14 they remained isolated, but a pushback against fast-tracked integration by President Kikwete coincided with a faltering in progress of planned projects between Rwanda, Kenya and Uganda. Tanzania's marginalization within the EAC is likely to end in 2016, as President Magufuli takes up its rotating leadership.

Tanzania's trade relations with SADC overshadow those with the EAC, because South Africa dominates as a key country of origin for goods entering Tanzania, and is one of the largest export destinations for Tanzanian goods, second only to India.⁷¹ South African companies swiftly built a dominant presence in Tanzania in the 1990s, as the end of apartheid coincided with the latter's economic liberalization, allowing South African companies to acquire a number of parastatal institutions during Tanzania's privatization process.⁷² Over 200 South African firms operate in Tanzania; they are most prominent in high-profit industries such as infrastructure and telecommunications. South Africa's Vodacom is the largest telecommunications firm in Tanzania.⁷³

Through the SADC Standby Force, the relationship between South Africa and Tanzania has also evolved into one of military collaboration. Together with South African and Malawian troops, 1,300 Tanzanian soldiers are part of the UN-mandated specialized Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) operational in eastern DRC. In 2013 the FIB was integrated into the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) to become the first UN force actively tasked by the organization to take offensive action, including the use of deadly force, in support of Congolese forces in their fight against rebel groups.⁷⁴

⁷⁰ Tanzania and Burundi are the other members of the EAC.


⁷¹ This is partly because of the value of South African imports, which are mainly manufactured goods, including mechanical equipment and technology. Tanzanian exports to South Africa consist chiefly of raw materials including gold, coffee and cashew nuts.

⁷² For example, SABMiller acquired Tanzania Breweries in 1993, ABSA Bank acquired the National Bank of Commerce in 2000 and South African Airways won a large stake in Air Tanzania Corporation in 2002. Schroeder, R. A. (2008), 'South African Capital in the Land of Ujamaa: Contested Terrain in Tanzania', *African Sociological Review*, 12(1): pp. 20–34, <http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/asr.v12i1.43527> (accessed 30 Jan. 2016).

⁷³ There has been some pushback against the level of South African business presence. South African Airway's purchase of almost 50 per cent of Air Tanzania Corporation in 2002 was rescinded after four years due to difficult relations with Tanzanian officials and bad publicity in the country. In the same year, TANESCO came under the control of the South African consultancy firm Net Group Solutions, after a privatization process launched by the government. In 2006, the government renounced the contract, alleging complaints of poor performance of Net Group, centred on widespread power shortages in 2005. TANESCO, 'History', http://www.tanESCO.co.tz/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=38&Itemid=126 (accessed 30 Jan. 2016).

⁷⁴ The Tanzanian People's Defence Force is deployed to seven UN missions. These are the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), the UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI), the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), the UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), the UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) and the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA).

Figure 3: Tanzania’s trade with the EAC and SADC, 2008–14



Source: Extrapolated from Bank of Tanzania, Quarterly Economic Bulletin – September 2015.

While the DRC mission serves South Africa’s economic interest, Tanzania’s military involvement in the FIB is intended to shore up stability in a country that is a large source of refugees into Tanzania. However, one outcome of Tanzanian political and military action in the country has been the exacerbation of tensions with Rwanda. Under President Kikwete, messaging from Tanzania’s government on the role that Rwanda could play in ending the violence of rebel movements operating in the DRC was seen as inflammatory. Kikwete’s suggestion in 2013 that the Rwandan government should negotiate with the *Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda* (FDLR) – a DRC-based militia that consists of Rwandan fighters who participated in the 1994 genocide and that is accused by the UN of seeking to overthrow Rwanda’s current government⁷⁵ – met a sharp response from the Rwandan authorities. Rwanda’s President Paul Kagame reportedly described this suggestion as based on ‘ignorance’.⁷⁶

⁷⁵ United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO), <http://monusco.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=10727> (accessed 4 Feb. 2016).

⁷⁶ *The East African* (2015), ‘Kagame meets Kikwete, signalling bid to mend relations between countries’, 14 March 2015, <http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Tanzania--Rwanda-quietly-mending-fences-after-cold-war/-/2558/2653016/-/item/1/-/cd5axxz/-/index.html> (accessed 31 Jan. 2016).

This came in addition to a provocative statement from the Tanzanian foreign ministry that described the FDLR as a freedom-fighting organization,⁷⁷ despite the group being a target of MONUSCO; and Foreign Minister Bernard Membe publicly stating that he believed Rwanda to be a destabilizing force in the DRC, centred on Rwanda's alleged support of the M23 rebels.⁷⁸ At the height of tensions, both countries withdrew their respective ambassadors from Kigali and Dar es Salaam in 2014. While these pronouncements did not appear malicious, Tanzania's heavy-handed approach hampered its efforts to navigate complex and tense regional relations. President Kagame's presence at the inauguration of President Magufuli signals a thawing of a relationship that will nevertheless stay fragile as Tanzania's military presence in the DRC will remain, given that MONUSCO's mandate is likely to be extended beyond 2016.

Kenya, which is renowned for its capitalist endeavour, is often contrasted with Tanzania and its history of collectivist socialism. The countries' historical differences feed into competition over their similar economic attributes. Both draw significant revenue from tourism and horticulture, and both have made significant recent hydrocarbon finds. While Tanzania's size (the country is bigger than the four other EAC members combined) gives it the advantage of huge agricultural potential, Kenya's economic diversity, educational quality, long-standing market-friendly policies and prevalent use of English as the language of business mean that it leads the region in terms of economic size and dynamism. Kenya's move to speed up regional integration with its faster-moving neighbours soured relations with Tanzania in 2013 and 2014, but a visit to Nairobi by President Kikwete in October 2015 eased tensions and set the groundwork for a productive working relationship with his successor. President Magufuli's personal friendship with Raila Odinga, the leader of Kenya's opposition Coalition for Reforms and Democracy (CORD), who ran against President Uhuru Kenyatta in a fierce electoral campaign in 2013, raised speculation that Kenya's government would back Edward Lowassa to become Tanzania's president, due to the latter's regional standing based on his tenure as prime minister and his purported business-focused outlook, which was seen to contrast with Magufuli's more traditional domestically focused style of politics.

Tanzania's global partners

Looking East: relations between China and Tanzania

Chinese investment in infrastructure development worth billions of dollars has seen some pushback from East African citizens in recent years. It is therefore a point of pride for Chinese officials that in Tanzania China is perceived to hold more positive influence than any other international partners.⁷⁹ India, which is the largest export destination of Tanzanian goods, can rely on the sizeable Indian diaspora in the country to maintain business links. But the shared socialist history between Tanzania and China, with resultant long-standing ties between CCM and the Chinese Communist Party, serves as a major foundation for the ease of the countries' economic relations. China's largest foreign

⁷⁷ Rutayisire, E. and Kagire, E. (2014), 'Dar now rallies SADC to push Kigali into talks with rebels', *The East African*, 19 July 2014, www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Dar-now-rallies-SADC-to-push-Kigali-into-talks-with-rebels/-/2558/2390228/-/12e294j/-/index.html (accessed 31 Jan. 2016).

⁷⁸ 'M23 received various forms of support from Rwandan territory, including recruitment, troop reinforcement, ammunition deliveries and fire support', UN Security Council, *Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, New York: UN Security Council, 23 January 2014, p. 3, (accessed 31 Jan. 2016).

⁷⁹ Author interview carried out under the Chatham House Rule, 8 October 2015; REPOA and Afrobarometer (2015), 'China influence seen as strong, positive in Tanzania', 25 February 2015, http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/press-release/tanzania/tan_r6_pr_china.pdf (accessed 31 Jan. 2016).

aid project remains the construction of the TAZARA railway, linking Dar es Salaam to Zambia's Copperbelt, which was completed in 1975. There is also a strong military connection. China built the Tanzanian Military Academy in 1976 and the National Defence College in 2012.⁸⁰ It has been by far the largest contributor of military equipment to Tanzania over the past 15 years.⁸¹

However, beneath the high-level diplomacy there is some mistrust of China's presence in Tanzania. This centres on the alleged culpability of Chinese nationals in criminality in Tanzania, including ivory-smuggling,⁸² and the perceived impunity of Chinese businesses when their actions challenge Tanzanian law. The background and public reaction to the development of a gas pipeline from Mtwara to Dar es Salaam, completed in 2015 and financed through a \$1.2 billion loan from China Exim Bank, provides one example. Accusations were made in the Tanzanian media that contracts for the pipeline's construction were directly granted to three Chinese companies without a real tender, in breach of Tanzania's Public Procurement Act.⁸³ The Tanzanian People's Defence Force was deployed to quell fierce riots that broke out in Mtwara in protest against the development. This negative public reaction arose because of insufficient messaging about the likely nationwide benefits to be derived from the gas and the potential for further investment in Mtwara as a corollary of the gas extraction. Members of Tanzania's parliament alleged that anti-Chinese foreign influences were behind the protests.⁸⁴

China is Tanzania's largest trading partner and its second-largest investor after the United Kingdom. With India, China is the intended destination for Tanzanian LNG.

China is Tanzania's largest trading partner and its second-largest investor after the United Kingdom. With India, China is the intended destination for Tanzanian LNG. Chinese investment is central to Tanzania's infrastructure plans, which are hugely ambitious. Projects relating to transport and utilities infrastructure worth approximately \$19 billion are planned.⁸⁵ Bagamoyo Port, a legacy project of former president Kikwete, situated in his home district, is to be built by the Chinese firm China Merchants Group and is expected to be completed by 2023.

However, the closeness of the relationship exposes Tanzania to the fallout from China's economic downturn. In 2015, China experienced its slowest growth in 25 years, and for Tanzania this could slow the development of an ambitious portfolio of 16 Chinese-financed construction projects worth billions of dollars, agreed in a deal between President Xi Jinping and Kikwete in 2014. The economic impact of reduced Chinese demand for Tanzanian commodities and potential demand for LNG is also of concern. President Magufuli appealed to Chinese officials for greater strengthening of the bilateral relationship in one of his first official meetings with international partners after his inauguration, but changes in China could lead to more diversity in Tanzania's international partnerships.

⁸⁰ Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Tanzania (2012), 'President Kikwete officially launches the National Defence College (NDC)', 10 September 2012, <http://www.foreign.go.tz/resources/view/president-kikwete-officially-launches-the-national-defence-college-ndc>, (accessed 5 May 2015).

⁸¹ Tanzania has also received weapons from Italy, South Africa, the United Arab Emirates, Ukraine and the United Kingdom since 2000, but the range of equipment and number of orders from China over the same time period is unrivalled. Stockholm International Peace Research Institutes (SIPRI) Arms Transfers Database for 2000–2014, http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/trade_register.php (accessed 5 May 2015).

⁸² *Daily Nation* (2015), 'Chinese "Ivory queen" Yang Fenglan arrested, charged in Tanzania', 7 October 2015, <http://www.nation.co.ke/news/Chinese-Ivory-queen-arrested-charged-Tanzania/-/1056/2908560/-/bxj0la/-/index.html> (accessed 5 Feb. 2016); Environmental Investigation Agency (2014), *Vanishing Point: Criminality, Corruption and the Devastation of Tanzania's Elephants*, New York, NY: Environmental Investigation Agency, <https://eia-international.org/wp-content/uploads/EIA-Vanishing-Point-lo-res1.pdf> (accessed 5 Feb. 2016).

⁸³ '20 hard questions behind gas fiasco', *Guardian on Sunday*, 10 February 2013: <http://www.ippmedia.com/frontend/?l=51059> (accessed 2 Mar. 2016)

⁸⁴ *The Citizen* (2013), 'Why Mtwara violence is beyond gas pipeline', 23 May 2013, <http://www.thecitizen.co.tz/News/national/Why-Mtwara-violence-is-beyond-gas-pipeline/-/1840392/1861170/-/item/0/-/1154atb/-/index.html> (accessed 1 Mar. 2015).

⁸⁵ PWC (2013), *Africa Gearing Up*, PWC, <https://www.pwc.se/sv/transport/assets/africa-gearing-up.pdf> (accessed 5 Feb. 2016).

Tanzania's traditional donors

Tanzania is one of the top 10 recipients of overseas aid from the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) countries. Relations based on development partnerships with key donors remain politically significant. The country's biggest donors are the United States, Canada, Denmark, Sweden, Germany, Ireland, the United Kingdom, Finland, Japan, the African Development Bank, the World Bank and the European Commission. In general, Tanzania has had easy and cordial relationships with its European and North American partners, but donors have also wielded some influence over how seriously anti-corruption is taken by Tanzania's policy-makers.

As a result of the government's slow response to the IPTL scandal, 12 donor contributors to budget support suspended \$489 million of assistance until investigations were carried out. The US government also suspended a \$700 million Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) deal intended to provide water and electricity projects to Tanzania's rural areas. The government had to borrow heavily to fill this gap. Budgetary support was re-established in March 2015, but MCC funding was again suspended in December 2015 in response to the nullification of elections in Zanzibar. While the suspension of aid places pressure on the government, it affects the poorest Tanzanians hardest and the pressure is undermined if, as was the case with the IPTL scandal, flows are restarted without Tanzanian authorities' conclusive identification, investigation and prosecution of those involved in graft.

But Tanzania's positive attributes offer a contrast with its regional neighbours. Engagement with the country is less politically controversial for European and North American governments than it might be with Kenya, Uganda or Rwanda. This was reportedly a factor in President Barack Obama selecting Tanzania as the first East African country that he visited during his presidency, ahead of Kenya, where his father was born. President Kikwete was also the first African leader to visit the White House after Obama's election. In addition to its membership of the US's Power Africa initiative, in 2008 Tanzania received the MCC's biggest compact to date, worth \$698.1 million and focused on reducing poverty through the development of the transport, energy and water sectors.

Opportunities for business are becoming more prominent in British policy towards Tanzania – the United Kingdom was the source of over one-third of FDI into the country in 2014 – but the development relationship remains prominent.⁸⁶ The United Kingdom was the second-largest bilateral donor to Tanzania in 2014, providing £71 million in direct government budgetary support. From 2015, the United Kingdom joined other European donors in shifting its funding focus away from general budget support and towards funding for targeted sectoral support, with a focus on health, water and sanitation, and wealth creation. In 2014, Tanzania was named as one of five High Level Prosperity Partnerships, which aim to increase British trade and investment through in-country collaboration between the Department for International Development, the Foreign & Commonwealth Office and UK Trade and Investment. A 2014 memorandum of understanding also sets the stage for a British army training presence in Tanzania, a development likely to ensure that the United Kingdom maintains such a capacity in East Africa if its existing cooperation agreements with Kenya are not renewed.

⁸⁶ UK High Commission Dar es Salaam (2014), 'UK Minister for Africa upbeat about UK-Tanzania Relations', 15 July 2014, <https://www.gov.uk/government/world-location-news/uk-minister-for-africa-upbeat-about-uk-tanzania-relations> (accessed 5 Feb. 2016).

7. Conclusion

Tanzania's economic and political future rests on the need for astute policy-making by its new government, but this challenge comes at a time of many potential hurdles. With its young and growing population, shifting political dispensation, mineral and agricultural wealth, and position between East, Central and southern Africa, Tanzania must arrange the building blocks correctly in order to maximize gains and to grow sustainably.

President Magufuli's cabinet, staffed with technocrats and academics, is well placed to identify needed improvements for growth, but it will also face potential limitations if this focus runs counter to the priorities of the CCM elite. Over the next five years, inner-party workings are likely to hold as much political implication as inter-party competition.

For mainland Tanzania, the transition period after the 2015 elections has been smooth as CCM and UKAWA have differentiated themselves from each other in the country's new, more competitive political environment. This will also help to build the role of parliament, where scrutiny of the management of hydrocarbons will be a key concern of the population and foreign investors alike. But the long political impasse over Zanzibar betrays an intention on the part of CCM to hold on to power in the islands at all costs. The situation in Zanzibar holds the potential to drive Tanzania into deeper political division, and to expose a country commonly described as a 'donor darling' to more stringent donor admonishment. There are already signals of this, as a joint statement released in February 2016 by the diplomatic missions of 13 European countries, the United States and Canada called for continued negotiation between parties in Zanzibar, and criticized the planned election re-run on 20 March 2016.⁸⁷

The long-postponed referendum on the draft constitution might go ahead or it might be scrapped, but either scenario could help to settle the question of the structure of government that continues to hang over the union between mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar. Hopes for a lasting peace lie in the fact that supporters of the existing two-government system and those who have called for the introduction of a three-tier system share an appreciation of the benefits that mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar draw from their union. But this shared vision is a fragile one. CUF's declaration that it will not participate in the 20 March re-run limits the extent of hope. Without a political settlement that accounts for the strength of CUF's support in Zanzibar, there is a danger that the violence of earlier elections on the islands will re-emerge.

For Tanzania's population, better transport infrastructure and basic development outcomes – especially in education, health, electrification, and water and sanitation – remain a key path to economic improvement. CCM will need to accelerate efforts in each of these areas to avoid being punished by voters in the 2020 elections. The selection of relative unknowns with long experience in their respective fields to lead the ministries of education, finance and health is an indication that they have been hand-selected by President Magufuli rather than the party, and offers hope that he sees them as capable and effective in achieving his vision of fast-tracked delivery. In addition, where donors can ensure that their priorities align closely with those of the government, faster and better results will ensue.⁸⁸

⁸⁷ UK High Commission Dar es Salaam (2016), 'Statement on announcement of Election re-run in Zanzibar', 1 February 2016, <https://www.gov.uk/government/world-location-news/statement-on-announcement-of-election-re-run-in-zanzibar> (accessed 2 Feb. 2016).

⁸⁸ Author interview carried out under the Chatham House Rule, Dar es Salaam, 8 October 2015.

While institutional barriers to preventing corruption remain, the systems of oversight, including a parliament that can work unencumbered by the executive, are having some impact. But the introduction of legislation that reduces space for the media and civil society to criticize the government, along with the past susceptibility of anti-corruption agencies to political pressure, means that without the proper and consistent application of pressure from Tanzanians on their leaders to implement it, existing anti-corruption legislation will have very limited effect.

Improved public service delivery, better opportunities for young people and job creation are all goals that the government has tied closely to the monetization of gas. This provides impetus for the quick development of gas resources, but the aims can also be supported through economic diversification and a more business-friendly policy environment. The challenge for President Magufuli's government lies in conveying the fact that support from the private sector can be utilized to enhance the positive legacies of Tanzanian socialism, including collective responsibility and frugality.

Tanzania's size, location, relative political stability and demographic trajectory mean that it cannot be easily marginalized in the long term by its more rapidly integrating neighbours. The careful path it treads between the EAC and SADC means that, for now, Tanzania will not face pressure to make a final choice on which side it sits. Despite its inner political uncertainties in the run-up to the 2015 elections, Tanzania was one of the five least-developed countries receiving the highest flows of FDI in the world, worth \$2.1 billion in 2014,⁸⁹ an indicator of its significant economic potential. This position is based on the unique nature of a country that – although sometimes regionally outmanoeuvred – can draw strength and stability from a population with a united vision of what it means to be Tanzanian.

⁸⁹ UN Conference on Trade and Development (2015), *World Investment Report 2015*, New York, NY and Geneva: UN Conference on Trade and Development, http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2015_en.pdf (accessed 30 Jan. 2016).

About the Author

Adjoa Anyimadu is a research associate for the Africa Programme at Chatham House. Her work focuses on the politics of Tanzania, Kenya and Africa's maritime security. She has conducted research in East, West and southern Africa, and has been consulted, in her capacity as an expert on the region, by policymaking bodies including the International Piracy Ransoms Taskforce, the UK Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee and the European Union.

Acknowledgments

The author is grateful to the Tanzanian and international representatives of government, diplomatic missions, business, media and civil society who granted interviews in Dar es Salaam and Zanzibar during research trips in February 2014, July, August and October 2015. All interviews were conducted under the Chatham House Rule. Thanks are also extended to Partha Moman for support in data editing and analysis, peer reviewers, the Chatham House Africa Programme and Chatham House's publications team for their support.

About the Africa Programme

The Africa Programme at Chatham House develops independent policy-focused research on issues affecting individual states of Africa, their relations in the international system and African regional and continental politics.

Since its establishment in 2002, the Africa Programme has grown to become a world-leading independent centre for policy research and debate on Africa's international politics. With the transformation of Africa's international position, the programme has worked to improve the quality of information available to international policy- and decision-makers.

The programme's research priorities emphasize issues affecting individual African states and the continent as a whole that are currently under-researched, and key issues pertaining to Africa in the international system.

Current research areas include:

- Governance and transparency
- Piracy and armed non-state actors
- Africa and the international system
- Peace and security
- Resources and society

The Africa Programme has an international network of research partners around the world, and works closely with other institutes to promote analysis with a global perspective.

Programme events provide the opportunity to engage world-renowned figures from across Africa and beyond to come and offer their perspectives on issues pertinent to the national, regional and international politics or the continent. More information is available at www.chathamhouse.org/africa

Independent thinking since 1920

Chatham House, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, is an independent policy institute based in London. Our mission is to help build a sustainably secure, prosperous and just world.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical including photocopying, recording or any information storage or retrieval system, without the prior written permission of the copyright holder. Please direct all enquiries to the publishers.

Chatham House does not express opinions of its own. The opinions expressed in this publication are the responsibility of the author.

Copyright © The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2016

Cover image: Magogoni ferry arrives at city full of commuters.
Copyright © Charles Bowman/Getty Images

ISBN 978 1 78413 122 7

This publication is printed on recycled paper.

The Royal Institute of International Affairs
Chatham House
10 St James's Square, London SW1Y 4LE
T +44 (0)20 7957 5700 F +44 (0)20 7957 5710
contact@chathamhouse.org www.chathamhouse.org

Charity Registration Number: 208223